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THE MARKET FOR CONTRACTS
Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg*

ABSTRACT

Recent empirical work has established that New York supplies the
law and forum in nearly half the material commercial contracts of
public firms. In this respect New York plays a role for commercial
contracts analogous to the role played by Delaware with respect to
corporate charters. Is the revealed preference for New York law and
forum merely the result of choices made by the contractingparties, or
does New York actively competefor this business? This paper describes
ways in which New York seeks to attract and retain corporatecontracts
in competition with other potentialproviders of law andforum. More
generally, the paper demonstrates the existence of a robust marketfor
choices of law andforum in major corporatecontracts.

Recent empirical work has established that New York State is the
dominant provider of law and adjudicatory services for large
commercial contracts.' New York law is chosen in over 45 percent of
the material contracts of public companies, with Delaware exercising an
important but secondary influence. New York also dominates forumselection clauses, being selected in 41% of the contracts that specified a
forum for resolving disputes.
What accounts for New York's importance in this area? This
paper demonstrates that New York actively competes in an interstate
market for corporate contracts. New York attracts contracts by offering
a menu of substantive rules that are desired by the contracting parties
* Miller is Stuyvesant P. Comfort Professor of Law, New York University, email:
geoffrey.miller@nyu.edu; Eisenberg is Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
We thank Omri Ben-Shahar, Oscar Chase, Kevin Davis, Theodore Eisenberg, Jill Fisch, David
Hyman, Marcel Kahan, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Richard McAdams, Roberta Romano, Alan
Schwartz, and Linda Silberman for comments, and Natalie Erbe, Jeremy Masys, Cathy Weist, and
Nadav Weg for valuable research assistance.
I Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York.- An Empirical Study of
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts, 30
CARDOZO L. REv. 1475 (2009).
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and by providing prompt, efficient, and reliable procedures and
institutions for resolving disputes. Attracting contracts serves the
state's economic interests and increases demand for the services of New
York attorneys. The features of the market for contracts resemble those
2
of the much better-known interstate market for corporate charters.
This Article is structured as follows. Part I describes how changes
in legal doctrine opened up the possibility of a market for contractsspecifically, the reversal of rules that once disfavored recognition of
choice-of-law and forum selection clauses. Part II examines evidence
that New York actively competes to attract commercial contracts. We
end with a brief conclusion.

I.

ENFORCEABILITY OF CHOICE OF LAW AND FORUM SELECTION
CLAUSES

A key precondition for any market is that purchasers have a choice
of vendor. In the case of corporate charters, the conditions for such a
market were in place by the early twentieth century. The rule had long
been that the state of incorporation governed a company's internal
affairs. 3 This did not in itself confer party autonomy over corporate law
2 For recognition of the similarity between these two issues, see Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing
Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. LAW 245, 270 (1993); Erin O'Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A
Public Choice Analysis of ContractualChoice of Law, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1551, 1570 n.98 (2000).
The vast literature on this issue goes back to William L. Carey, Federalism and CorporateLaw:
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). Questions of whether and to what extent
states compete for corporate charters, and whether such competition represents a socially
desirable phenomenon, continue to perplex corporate law theory today. For a partial sampling of
recent work, see, e.g., Robert Dames, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN.
ECON. 525 (2001); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to
Incorporate,46 J. L. & ECON. 383 (2003); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalismand
Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168
(1999); Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State
Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002); Guhan Subramanian, The
Influence ofAntitakeover Statutes on IncorporationChoice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate and
Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1795 (2002); William J. Carney, The Political
Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (1997); Randall A.
Heron & Wilbur G. Lewellen, An EmpiricalAnalysis of the ReincorporationDecision, 33 J. FIN.
& QUANT. ANALYSIS 549 (1998); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the
Marketfor CorporateLaw, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205 (2001) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar, Price
Discrimination];Mark J. Roe, Delaware'sCompetition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003); Edward
M. Iacobucci, Toward a Signaling Explanation of the PrivateChoice of CorporateLaw, 6 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 319 (2004); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in
CorporateLaw, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar, The Myth of State
Competition]; Guhan Subramanian, The DisappearingDelaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32
(2004); Roberta Romano, The States As A Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition
for CorporateCharters,23 YALE J. ON REG. 209 (2006).
3 See Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Extraterritorial Courts for Corporate Law I (Eur.
Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Law, Working Paper No. 43/20058m 2005),
availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=724165.
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because entrepreneurs needed the power to pick the chartering state.
Over the course of the nineteenth century they gradually acquired such
power. Charters became available as of right early in the century, thus
relieving promoters from the need to seek special legislative
authorization to do business in the corporate form. 4 Firms gained
authority to operate nationwide as a result of the Supreme Court's 1910
5
decision denying states the power to exclude foreign corporations.
Final liberation came when states ceased requiring a nexus with a firm's
activities as a condition to granting a charter. 6 By the early twentieth
century incorporators could (a) readily obtain charters; (b) know that
internal affairs would be governed by the law of the chartering state; (c)
operate in states other than the chartering state; and (d) refrain from
operating in the chartering state. The result was that by the beginning
of the twentieth century entrepreneurs enjoyed broad ability to select the
law governing their firm's internal affairs.
The parties' ability to influence the forum was more limited. The
state of incorporation would always be open to litigation in which the
corporation was a defendant. But states other than the chartering states
began to assert jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations during the
nineteenth century. 7 If the corporation was a plaintiff or co-defendant,
moreover, it would be necessary for the court to obtain jurisdiction over
out-of-state defendants, making it more likely that suit would be
8
brought in some other court where these defendants could be found.
Ironically, therefore, as entrepreneurs became more capable of selecting
the law governing their firms' internal affairs, they lost assurance as to
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the selection of a state for chartering
purposes continued (and continues) to have an important influence on
the forum that resolves disputes under the charter. 9
4 Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of
CorporatePrivileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 135, 138-58 (1985).
5 See Western Union Tele. Co. v. Kansas ex rel Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 27 (1910) ("[A]
corporation of one State, authorized by its charter to engage in lawful commerce among the
states, may not be prevented by another State from coming into its limits for all the legitimate
purposes of such commerce.").
6 See Butler, supra note 4; Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering,
1875-1929, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 677, 681 (1989) (describing how New Jersey granted general
permission for New Jersey corporations to operate outside the state).
7 See Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts-FromPennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569,
577-86 (1958).
8 While chartering states had means for coercing corporate directors to submit to their
jurisdiction (for example by requiring consent to jurisdiction as a condition for becoming
directors), such efforts were not always undertaken and when undertaken were not always
successful. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
9 Even in recent years, corporate litigation involving Delaware firms has tended to be
brought in Delaware, notwithstanding the theoretical availability of other courts to resolve the
dispute.

See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 41 (1993)

[hereinafter ROMANO, GENIUS]. For a critique of the impact of the state of incorporation doctrine
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The conditions for the development of a market for contracts took
longer to develop. Throughout much of the history of American law,
such a market was impracticable due to the interaction of two factors:
courts often refused to enforce choice-of-law and forum-selection
clauses; and even if the courts enforced them, these clauses offered only
limited benefits.
Parties seeking to enforce choice-of-law clauses were required to
convince the court that their choice was bonafide.'0 This meant that the
designated law had to have some reasonably close relationship with the
contract itself, indicating that the parties had not sought to avoid the
authority of an otherwise applicable law. In practice the parties were
limited to place of contracting or place of performance. 11 Underlying
the hostility towards choice-of-law clauses was the sense that they
represented an impermissible usurpation of state power. This was the
objection of Joseph Beale, the reporter for the First Restatement of
Conflicts of Laws, who condemned choice-of-law clauses as conferring
the equivalent of legislative power on the contracting parties. 12
Even if courts had enforced choice-of-law clauses, moreover, the
parties would have obtained only limited benefit. Then-applicable
conflict of laws rules sought to impose clear standards for identifying
the substantive law to be applied in contract cases.1 3 Thus any court's
application of choice of law rules was reasonably likely to result in the
same state's law being applied. Even if conflict of law principles would
select different laws the effect was likely to be slight, given the
prevailing view that contracts were governed by general common law.14
Residual variation among states was checked by the principle of Swift v.

in subjecting the firm to litigation in the chartering state, see Jens Dammann, A New Approach to
CorporateChoice of Law, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51 (2005).

10 See Joseph H. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract: III. Theoretical and
PracticalCriticisms of the Authorities, 23 HARV. L. REV. 260, 261-62 (1910).
11 See id. at 262.
12 Id. at 260.

13 Under the First Restatement of Conflicts of Laws, issues of contract validity were to be
governed by the place of execution of the contract while issues going to the details of
performance were to be governed by the place of performance. E.g., RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 346 (1934) (law of place of contracting determines extent of contractual
obligations); id. § 358 (law governing performance is that of the place of performance); id. § 362
(time of performance determined under law of the place of performance); id. § 370 (breach
determined under the law of place of performance). In practice, these categories were sometimes
difficult to apply to contracts involving contacts with multiple states. O'Hara, supra note 2, at
1560 n.40. Nevertheless, these rules provided some degree of predictability-certainly more than
is offered by the Second Restatement approach. See id. at 1560 n.41.
14 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC

CASE STUDY 24, 186 (1965).

The concept of a uniform body of contract law was an implicit

premise of Williston's influential treatise. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

iii (1920) (deeming it desirable "to treat the subject of contracts as a whole, and to show the wide
range of application of its principles").
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 2076 2008-2009
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Tyson, 15 which made general law applicable in diversity of citizenship
If in a case involving
cases involving commercial questions.
adversaries from different states the contract law of one state deviated
from prevailing norms, the litigation was likely to be brought into
federal court and there decided under general law. Accordingly, there
was typically little benefit to selecting the law of any particular state
because the case would be decided according to the same rules
regardless of which state was chosen. Choice-of-law clauses would
neither increase predictability nor opt into more desirable legal rules.
Forum-selection clauses also provided only limited benefits to
contracting parties. Such clauses were usually effective to confer
personal jurisdiction on the court selected by the parties, on the theory
that the party consented to the court's authority. 16 And courts would
enforce judgments or awards entered by tribunals to whose power the
parties submitted. 7 But most courts refused to enforce forum-selection
clauses which purported to vest exclusive jurisdiction elsewhere. The
theory was that such clauses represented an "ouster" of judicial power.' 8
Efforts to circumvent this rule by making submission to the selected
tribunal a condition precedent to a suit were generally unavailing. 19
Even if a court enforced forum-selection clauses, moreover, the effect
would often be slight for reasons already mentioned: the selected
tribunal would usually apply the same principles of substantive law as
would have been applied in the original forum.
The current salience of choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses
is due to changes in background rules. Courts became increasingly
The drafters of the Second
receptive to choice-of-law clauses.
20 and the Uniform Commercial Code 2'
Law
of
Restatement of Conflicts
endorsed them. Courts today enforce choice-of-law provisions unless
they bear no reasonable relationship with the state, violate an important
public policy, or are otherwise unenforceable under ordinary contract
22
principles.
15 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16 See Joseph Henry Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts Over Foreigners,26 HARV. L. REV.
193, 199 (1913).
17 For judgments of courts in other states, recognition is required under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Judicial enforcement of arbitration awards was

sometimes qualified with conditions that the arbitration process must be procedurally fair and not
clearly erroneous. See Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration
Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 484
(1995).
18 See Michael Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in Internationaland Interstate Commercial
Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 133, 138-40 (1982); Glenda Burke Slaymaker, The Legality of
ContractsAffecting the Jurisdictionof Courts, 58 CENT. L. J. 64, 64 (1904).
19 Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C. R. Co., 105 N.E. 653 (N.Y. 1914).
20 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 6(2)(d), 187 (1971).
21 See U.C.C. § 1-105 (1) (1999).
22 For an example of how far courts will go towards recognizing party choice of law, a
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Concomitantly with the increasing legal recognition of choice-of-

law clauses, courts and legislatures dismantled the framework which
previously had provided a degree of certainty and predictability as to
applicable law in the absence of party choice. Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins 23 rejected the notion of general common law in diversity of
citizenship cases, thus removing the safety valve of federal jurisdiction.
The number of courts potentially capable of adjudicating disputes
multiplied with the expansion of personal jurisdiction under
International Shoe v. Washington.24 Principles of conflicts of law
became less predictable as states adopted standard-based approaches

such as that contained in the Second Restatement. Thus at around the
same time choice-of-law clauses achieved legal recognition, the
rationale for adopting them became more compelling. These factors,
working in tandem, resulted in the widespread practice of including
25
choice-of-law clauses in major commercial contracts.
Forum selection clauses also achieved legal recognition during the
past century. The first change came in the context of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses, rendered enforceable by state statutes beginning in
1920 and federal law in 1925.26 Such clauses are now routinely
enforced. 27 Outside the arbitration context, the enforceability of forum
selection clauses remained in doubt until the Supreme Court's 1972
decision in The Bremen v. Zapata28 declaring a forum-selection clause
"prima facie valid. '29 Bremen left open the possibility that a party

number of federal circuits have recognized the power of parties to international contracts to opt
out of the United States securities laws, at least when the foreign law selected to govern the
transaction provides some protections. See Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d
1285, 1292-99 (1 lth Cir. 1998); Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1292-96 (9th Cir.
1998); Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 962-70 (5th Cir. 1997); Allen v. Lloyd's of
London, 94 F.3d 923, 928-30 (4th Cir. 1996); Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 159-62 (7th
Cir. 1993); Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1360-66 (2d Cir. 1993); Riley v. Kingsley
Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 956-58 (10th Cir. 1992). However, courts still
decline to enforce choice-of-law clauses in unusual cases. See, e.g., Bush v. Nat'l Sch. Studios,
Inc., 407 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. 1987) (refusing on public policy grounds to enforce choice-of-law
clause in franchise agreement); Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d
73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (refusing to enforce choice of law clause in covenant not to compete);
J.S. Alberici Constr. Co. v. Mid-West Conveyor Co., 750 A.2d 518 (Del. 2000) (refusing to
enforce choice-of-law clause that would have permitted contractor to avoid liability for
negligence).

23 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
25 See Eisenberg & Miller,supra note 1.
26 For an account of how the law shifted towards making pre-dispute arbitration clauses
enforceable, see infra notes 35-86 and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
28 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
29 Id. at 10.
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 2078 2008-2009
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could contest the clause as unreasonable. However, if a commercial
party knowingly and voluntarily agreed to a forum it is hard to see why
holding the party to the bargain would be unreasonable. The Supreme
Court left little doubt on that score when, in Carnival Cruises, it upheld
30 Most
a forum-selection clause in a consumer contract of adhesion.
state courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead in enforcing
forum-selection clauses, 3 1 but several still refuse to enforce them, or do
32
so only with significant limitations and qualifications.
These developments in choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses
created opportunities for contracting parties to select the law and forum
to govern their affairs. Limitations remained, however, by virtue of the
requirement that there be a relationship between the transaction and the
chosen law and forum. This nexus requirement has not yet broken
down for ordinary commercial contracts. However, several states have
enacted statutes assuring that their law and forum will be available for
major contracts regardless of the parties' other connections with the
state. 33 Although these statutes do not guarantee results (other states
may not respect them), they go a long way towards making choice of
law and forum just as discretionary for commercial contracts as
chartering is for incorporations.

II.

THE APPEAL OF NEW YORK LAW

The upshot of the foregoing analysis is that the preconditions for a
The empirical evidence
market for contracts are now in place.
mentioned above establishes that such a market is, in fact, in place, at
least on the demand side: parties to major commercial contracts
routinely select a forum to govern disputes under the contract, and
often, although less frequently, select a forum. 34 But is there also a
supply side to the market for contracts? Do states affirmatively seek to
attract party choices of law and forum? This section presents evidence
that states do compete for commercial contracts. In particular, this
section demonstrates that New York-the most successful provider of
law and forum for major contracts-in fact has, for the better part of a
century, engaged in vigorous efforts to attract this business.
30 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
31 Enforcement is generally favored under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF
LAWS § 80 (1971), providing that the parties' agreement as to the place of the action is to be
given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 421, cmt. H (1987) (generally requiring enforcement of forum selection

clauses even if the defendant is not otherwise amenable to suit in the jurisdiction).
32 See infra notes 111-119 and accompanying text.

33 See discussion infra notes 127-131 and accompanying text.
34 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 1.
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Arbitration Clauses

Through most of American history New York City was the
nation's leading venue for commercial arbitration, 35 with services
offered both by trade associations 36 and by the New York Chamber of
Commerce, an association of merchants which had offered general
37
arbitration services since 1768.
But New York's ability to attract general arbitration business was
significantly limited by the doctrine of revocability: pre-dispute
arbitration agreements were considered to be revocable at will and thus
were not specifically enforceable in court. When a dispute arose one
party was likely to perceive advantages in going to court, either because
he could benefit from delay or because he believed that general law
offered a greater chance of success than principles of commercial
usage. 38 The rule of revocability allowed a party to avoid arbitration by
refusing to participate (if a defendant) or filing a lawsuit (if a
39
plaintiff).
The rule of revocability was not a significant handicap for
industry-specific arbitration tribunals because social pressure within the
industry could substitute for the lack of legal enforceability of a predispute arbitration agreement. 40 But the New York Chamber of
Commerce, as a general arbitration tribunal, could not rely on extralegal sanctions to ensure compliance. 41
Denied either specific
35 See,
e.g.,
IAN
MACNEIL,
AMERICAN
ARBITRATION
LAW:
REFORMATION,
NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION
25-31
(1992);
JULIUS
HENRY
COHEN,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 10 (1918) [hereinafter COHEN, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION].

36 By the first decades of the twentieth century arbitration tribunals were well established in
the rubber, silk, produce, dried fruit, lumber, building trades, printing, and clothing industries,
among others. See FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND
ACHIEVEMENTS 6-8 (1948) [hereinafter KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION] (building trades,
printing, and clothing); Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New FederalArbitration
Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 280 (1926) (rubber, silk, produce, dried fruit, and lumber).
37 FRANCES KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION: A REPORT PREPARED FOR
THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 7 (1952) [hereinafter KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION]; Benson, supra note 17, at 482.
38 Cohen & Dayton, supra note 36, at 270.
39 See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings On S. 1005 And H.R.
646 Before The Subcommittees of The Committees of The Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14
(1924) (hereinafter "Joint Hearings") (testimony of Julius Cohen) ("the difficulty is that men do
enter into such agreements and then afterwards repudiate the agreement").
40 See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 36, at 266 ("Systems of arbitration depending for their
effectiveness wholly upon the moral suasion of the business community have grown up in the
past decades in many lines of American business. Usually the most successful are to be found in
the ranks of thoroughly organized trade associations which can exercise an effective
discipline ... ").
41 Id. at 270 ("business has become so used to the doctrine of revocability of arbitration
agreements that these clauses are not regarded in the same light as other contractual obligations").
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 2080 2008-2009
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performance or an effective extra-legal sanction, the disappointed party
would be remitted, at best, to the inadequate remedy of damages for
breach of the agreement to arbitrate. 42 These difficulties placed the
Chamber at a distinct disadvantage in competition with specialized
43
tribunals for the provision of arbitration services.
Developments elsewhere presented even greater threats to the
England had made pre-dispute
Chamber's arbitration business.
arbitration agreements enforceable by statute in 1886, 44 resulting in an
increase in the caseload of the London Court of Arbitration 45-no doubt
at the Chamber's expense. 46 The Chamber also faced domestic
competition. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in 1913 that predispute arbitration clauses were enforceable notwithstanding a statute
which purported to nullify them. 47 The result was that parties might opt
for a Pennsylvania arbitrator in order to enhance prospects that
arbitration agreements would be effective. 48 If other states followed
42 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Home Ins. Co., 137 U.S. 370, 385 (1890); Union Ins. Co. v. Central
Trust Co., 52 N.E. 671, 674 (N.Y. 1899); Miller v. Junction Canal Co., 41 N.Y. 98, 100 (N.Y.
1869); Haggart v. Morgan, 5 N.Y. 422, 426 (N.Y. 1851). The remedy was inadequate because,
given the unenforceability of agreements to arbitrate, courts would not award damages based on
the expected arbitral award.
43 Bruce L. Benson provides evidence that the Chamber of Commerce was losing increasing
business to these specialized arbitration tribunals during the course of the nineteenth century.
Benson, supra note 17, at 486-87.
44 See English Arbitration Act of 1889, 52 & 53 VICT., c. 49 (Eng.); Manchester Ship Canal
Co. v. S. Pearson & Son, 2 Q.B. 606 (1900); Austrian Lloyd Steamship Co. v. Gresham Life
Assurance Soc., 1 K.B. 249 (1903); see also Conference of Bar Association Delegates, 5 A.B.A.
J. 48 (1919) (remarks of Charles L. Bernheimer) (noting New York's competitive disadvantage
compared with England).
45 Contracts between English and American parties frequently included agreements to
arbitrate disputes in England. U.S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F.
1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (describing such a clause as "very ordinary"); A.W. Brian Simpson,
Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 CARDOzO L. REV. 287,
293-314, 321 (1989) (describing arbitration of cotton contracts in England); Cohen, Commercial
Arbitration, supra note 35, at 20-21 (noting that by the early twentieth century England had
developed a well-established system of commercial arbitration in many industries). While
specifying arbitration in England increased the probability that the parties would arbitrate their
dispute, it did not guarantee that result because the aggrieved party could bring preemptive
litigation in a jurisdiction such as New York that refused on public policy grounds to enforce predispute arbitration agreements. See TrinidadLake, 222 F. at 1006.
46 The two tribunals clearly competed for business. In 1919 the London Court of Arbitration
asked the New York Chamber of Commerce to promulgate a model arbitration clause which
would submit all disputes under the contract to arbitration in London. The Chamber declined the
invitation and instead recommended a model clause submitting the dispute to arbitration before
the Committee on Arbitration of the New York Chamber of Commerce. See Conference of Bar
Association Delegates, supra note 44.
47 Adinolfi v. Hazlett, 88 A. 869, 870 (Pa. 1913). The decision, overturning a statute enacted
in 1907, restored the authority of a line of Pennsylvania cases that had recognized the
enforceability of arbitration clauses. See Snodgrass v. Gravit, 28 Pa. 221 (1857). Virginia had
also recognized the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. Condon v. Southside R.R.
Co., 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 302 (Va. 1858). See generally Benson, supra note 17, at 486.
48 This would not guarantee arbitration, but would significantly increase the chance that the
clause would be enforced. Arbitration was not assured because the aggrieved party might sue in a
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 2081 2008-2009
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Pennsylvania's lead the Chamber's pre-eminence in domestic
49
arbitration would be jeopardized.
The Chamber of Commerce responded to these threats to its
business. In 1911 it appointed a committee on arbitration under the
leadership of Charles L. Bemheimer, a cotton trader, with the apparent
objective of modernizing and improving the Chamber's arbitration
services. Ably assisted by the Chamber's General Counsel Julius Henry
Cohen, 50 Bernheimer revamped procedures and upgraded the arbitrator
list.51 But these efforts provided only partial protection. The Chamber
could not maintain its dominant position in commercial arbitration, over
the long run, unless New York abandoned the rule of revocability.
The Chamber's hopes in this respect were disappointed in 1914
when the New York Court of Appeals decided Meacham v.
Jamestown.52 This was a lawsuit brought in New York by a
Pennsylvania contractor against a Pennsylvania railroad for work done
in Pennsylvania. The contract required the parties to submit disputes to
the chief engineer before bringing suit. The trial court, in a decision
affirmed by the Appellate Division, dismissed the case on the ground
that under Pennsylvania law submission to the arbitrator was a
mandatory precondition to suit. But the Court of Appeals rejected the
clause on public policy grounds, thus allowing the litigation to go
forward in New York. Judge Cardozo's concurring opinion made it
clear that even if New York courts might defer to forum-selection
clauses that called for adjudication, the same was not true for
arbitration: "[i]f any exceptions to the general rule are to be admitted,
we ought not to extend them to a contract where the exclusive
jurisdiction has been bestowed, not on the regular courts of another
jurisdiction that refused to enforce such agreements-as happened the following year. Meacham
v. Jamestown, F. & C. R. Co., 105 N.E. 653 (N.Y. 1914).
49 The possibility of loss of business if Pennsylvania's innovation were followed elsewhere
was not lost on New York judges: Judge Cardozo commented that if New York courts were to
enforce arbitration agreements valid under Pennsylvania law, "jurisdiction over controversies
arising under such contracts may be withdrawn from our courts and the litigation remitted to
arbitrators in distant states." Meacham, 105 N.E. at 656 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
50 IAN MACNEIL,

AMERICAN ARBITRATION

LAW:

REFORMATION,

NATIONALIZATION,

INTERNATIONALIZATION 28 (1992). Cohen served as general counsel of the New York State
Chamber of Commerce and later the New York Port Authority. See JAMESON W. DOIG, EMPIRE
ON THE HUDSON: ENTREPRENEURIAL VISION AND POLITICAL POWER AT THE PORT OF NEW

YORK AUTHORITY 17-18, 31, 39, 66, 190-93 (2001). Cohen had been an attorney for clothing
manufacturers during the New York garment workers strike of 1910, and had in that capacity
advocated arbitration as a method for the communal resolution of the dispute. See Yankl
Stillman, Edward Filene: Pioneer of Social Responsibility, JEWISH CURRENTS, Sept. 2004;
Obituary, Julius Cohen, 77, Lawyerfor 53 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1950, at 12.
51 See Conference of Bar Association Delegates, supra note 44, 45-46 (1919); COHEN,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 35, at viii; JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THEY BUILDED
BETTER THAN THEY KNEW 152-53 (J. Messner, Inc. 1971) (1946) [hereinafter COHEN, BUILDED
BETTER].

52 Meacham, 105 N.E. 653.
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53

The possibility remained that federal courts would reach a different
result. But those prospects too were crushed in U.S. Asphalt Refining
Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co. 54 A South Dakota corporation had

chartered vessels from a British owner and used them for transporting
The chartering
goods between the United States and Trinidad.
agreement provided that disputes would be resolved by arbitration in
London. It was undisputed that the agreement to arbitrate was valid

under English law. When war broke out in 1914 the British owner
reclaimed the ships, resulting in the American company filing a lawsuit

for damages in New York federal court. The owner moved to dismiss
for failure to comply with the arbitration agreement. The trial court
criticized the rule of revocability, finding it to be based on unsound
reasoning, but reluctantly declared the matter settled: "[i]nferior courts

may fail to find convincing reasons for it; but the rule must be
55
obeyed."
The Meacham and Trinidad Lake cases were not wholly
catastrophic. By refusing to enforce clauses specifying arbitration
under the laws of New York's principal competitors, these cases
undermined the competitive advantage England and Pennsylvania

would otherwise have enjoyed.56 But overall the cases were a setback.
They made it clear that the New York courts were not going to enforce
arbitration clauses no matter where the proceedings were to be
conducted. New York arbitrations would fail along with the rest. If

recourse was to be had against the "deadly rule" 57 of revocability, it had
58
to be through legislation.

Two groups joined to lobby for repeal. 59 The New York business
community supported arbitration as a low-cost alternative to litigation
as a means for resolving disputes. 60 Arbitration also received support
53 Id. at 655 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
54 222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
55 Id. at 1012.
56 London merchants were alarmed enough at the result of the Trinidad Lake case that they
remonstrated with the New York Chamber of Commerce. See Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of
CommercialArbitration and the New York Statute, 31 YALE L.J. 147 (1921).
57 COHEN, BUILDED BETTER, supra note 51, at 153.

58 The defendant did not take an appeal in the TrinidadLake case.
59 See KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION, supra note 36, at 10 n.4 (those two groups were
the New York State Bar Association and the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York).
60 Cohen & Dayton, supra note 36, at 265 (describing arbitration as a "movement which
commands an unusually widespread support in the business world"). The United States Chamber
of Commerce reported in 1925 that "the substantial element of the American business public is
overwhelmingly in favor of arbitration in the settlement of commercial disputes in both domestic
and foreign trade." Id. at 285. Hundreds of trade associations and businessmen supported the
work of the American Arbitration Association. Id. at 280; KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION,
supra note 36, at 186-98 (listing more than 500 individual businessmen in various industries who
had committed to promoting arbitration); id. at 199-203 (listing hundreds of trade associations
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from attorneys, 61 although their attitude was more ambivalent. 62 Here
the leading figure was Julius Henry Cohen, whose work with
Bernheimer had convinced him that commercial arbitrations were a
natural extension of a lawyer's business. 63 England's repeal of the rule
of revocability had resulted in a new and lucrative practice for attorneys
there; 64 Cohen believed that similar benefits could be captured by New
York lawyers. He argued that lawyers would be called to represent
clients in arbitration just as much as in litigation. 65 Lawyers' business
would even increase because clients would be induced to enforce their
rights if given access to speedy and inexpensive procedures. 66 Satisfied
clients would pay as much for arbitration as for litigation, no questions
asked. 67 Even if the attorney's fee were slightly lower this would not
matter because he also had lower expenses. 68 Overall the attorney would
69
earn a better return.
Between 1915 and 1920 Cohen and others worked on three fronts,
attempting to persuade business interests to accept attorneys as party
representatives and arbitrators, to persuade lawyers to support
arbitration as an alternative to litigation and to persuade the New York
legislature to repeal the rule of revocability. 70 Their efforts eventually

and their local subdivisions which agreed to promote arbitration).
61 For an account noting the role of attorneys in lobbying for arbitration reform, see Benson,
supra note 17, at 491-92.
62 In fact, attorneys were responsible for the demise of a formal arbitration court authorized
by the New York legislature in 1874 and abandoned in 1878. COHEN, BUILDED BETTER, supra
note 51, at 152-53; see also Benson, supra note 17, at 491-92; KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 37, at 19 (resistance among lawyers to arbitration attributed to
fear of "adverse effect upon the livelihood of bench and bar").
63 Arbitrations before the Chamber of Commerce were adversarial proceedings intended for
the benefit of the broader business community. KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, supra note 37, at 9. Lawyers could often play a role in these proceedings as
representatives of the parties or as paid arbitrators. In contrast, arbitrations before trade
organizations rarely included attorneys and thus offered few benefits to lawyers and some costs, if
disputes that would otherwise be tried in court were routed to an industry tribunal. Id. at 8. Some
trade organizations even prohibited attorney participation. Id.
64 Id. at 20.
65 Harris Jay Griston, The Substitution of Arbitrationfor Litigation, 2 N.Y.U. L. REV. 107,
109 (1925) ("lawyers are no more dispensable in a Tribunal of Arbitration than they are in a court
of law").
66 Id. at 116.
67 Id. ("the lawyer's fees are in no wise diminished by having his clients resort to
Arbitration"); Cohen & Dayton, supra note 35, at 283 (arbitration produced satisfied clients).
68 Griston, supra note 65, at 116.
69 Cohen & Dayton, supra note 35, at 283.
70 In 1916 Cohen persuaded the New York State Bar Association to form a Committee on
Prevention of Unnecessary Litigation, headed by Cohen, which was charged with enhancing
attorney involvement in arbitration. COHEN, BUILDED BETTER, supra note 51, at 155. A
principal task of this committee was to seek common ground with the New York Chamber of
Commerce for the coordinated provision of arbitration services. Common ground was not hard to
find, given that Cohen was also General Counsel of the Chamber and a close associate of
Bernheimer's. See Conference of Bar Association Delegates, 5 A.B.A. J. 45 (1919) (remarks of
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paid off: the New York legislature enacted a statute in 1920,11 heralding
72
a "new era in American arbitration.
The New York statute survived the inevitable constitutional
challenge. 73 But it did not provide complete protection for pre-dispute
arbitration clauses. When the disputants were of diverse citizenship
either could prevent enforcement, notwithstanding the New York
statute, simply by taking the dispute to federal court, which continued to
adhere to the rule of revocability. Given the Trinidad Lake case it was
evident that protection from this risk could only come from Congress.
The arbitration reform interests in New York therefore sought
enactment of a federal law. 74 The campaign culminated in the Federal
Arbitration Act of 1925,75 which, among other things, made pre-dispute
arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court.
Another problem with the New York statute was that it did nothing
to affect the laws of other states. Thus if a contract called for arbitration
in New York City, the aggrieved party might avoid arbitration by suing
the defendant in the courts of some state that did not enforce arbitration
clauses. This problem was mitigated by the federal statute, since if the
parties were of diverse citizenship either could ensure the clause was
enforced by bringing the action into federal court. But even after 1925
the problem remained, albeit in reduced form, where the parties were
not diverse and the plaintiff could obtain jurisdiction over the defendant
in a state that preserved the doctrine of revocability. New York
Charles L. Bemheimer, Chairman of the Committee of Arbitration of the New York Chamber of
Commerce). Eventually the Chamber and the bar committee agreed on uniform rules for
arbitration. COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 35, at 11.The groups also worked
for repeal of the revocability rule. Recognizing that any such law would face a constitutional
challenge, they sought to obtain a constitutional amendment authorizing the legislature to act in
the area, but were informed that no such amendment was needed. Id. at ix. In 1918, at the behest
of the New York Chamber of Commerce, Cohen published a monograph which promoted the
case for judicial enforcement of arbitration clauses. Id. at vii-xii (introduction of Charles L.
Bernheimer).
71 1920 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 275.
72 KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION, supra note 36, at 9.

73 Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288 (N.Y. 1921).
74 Cohen worked to persuade the American Bar Association of the benefits of repealing the
revocability rule, even bringing Bernheimer to address the Conference of Bar Association
Delegates on the subject. Bernheimer's remarks failed to generate a very positive reception,
however, after he admitted that, in his experience, arbitration cases handled without the assistance
of attorneys are disposed of "more quickly and in the long run more satisfactorily." Conference
of Bar Association Delegates, 5 A.B.A. J. 15, 56 (1919). On Cohen's prompting, the American
Bar Association prepared a draft of federal legislation modeled on the New York law (also
written by Cohen).

KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 37, at 38;

Joint Hearings, supra note 39, at 10 (testimony W.H.H. Piatt). Cohen and Bernheimer testified in
favor of the legislation before a joint hearing of the House and Senate judiciary committees. Id.
at 5-9 (testimony Charles L. Bernheimer); id. at 13-19 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen). The
New York-based Arbitration Society of America also lobbied for federal legislation. Id. at 25-28
(testimony Alexander Rose).
75 Codified as 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
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arbitration advocates thus sought to "spread the benefits of [the New
York statute] to all States, all trades and all industries compassed within
our national life."' 76 Repeal of the revocability rule in other states
threatened New York interests to some extent because it meant that
parties could specify other states as forums for arbitration; but the
potential loss of business was more than offset by the increased custom
expected to flow from assurance that contracts specifying New York as
the forum for arbitration would be enforced elsewhere.
Lobbying by arbitration advocates achieved a few early results:
New Jersey enacted a statute in 192377 and Massachusetts and Oregon
followed in 1925.78 California, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming fell into
line in 1927. 79 In general, however, state legislatures proved resistant to
The American Bar
enforcing pre-dispute arbitration clauses.
Association backed off its support8" and the Conference of
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws declined to propose a law
advocated by Cohen, 8' endorsing instead a provision that did not
include enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. 82 Only 15 states had
modern arbitration clauses on the books in 1945.83 This resistance to
arbitration reflected concerns of attorneys outside New York that
nationwide enforcement of arbitration clauses would benefit New York
lawyers at their expense. 84 In the words of one opponent,

76 See Griston, supra note 65, at 107.
77 1923 N.J. Laws 291.
78 See Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United
States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 250-51 (1927); Richard C. Curtis, A Comparison of the Recent
Arbitration Statutes, 13 A.B.A. J. 567, 567-70 (1927); KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION, supra
note 36, at 172.
79 Jones, supra note 78, at 250-51; Curtis, supra note 78, at 567-70.
80 KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 37, at 19.
81 See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING 63 (1925) (referring to the

proposal as Cohen's "pet child").
82 KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 37, at 19 (noting that

opposition from commission on uniform laws had been "instrumental in retarding further
progressive statutory legislation in this direction").
83 Id. at 20.
84 In retrospect, it appears that arbitration did in fact serve as a valuable source of business for
New York lawyers in the wake of the statutory reforms. Lawyers, especially New York lawyers,
continued to play a leading role in the activities of the American Arbitration Association, formed
in New York in 1926 in a merger between the Arbitration Society of America and the Arbitration
Foundation, an affiliate of the New York State Chamber of Commerce. KELLOR, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION, supra note 36, at 17-18 (describing active role played by lawyers in New York
arbitration organizations). The American Arbitration Association, although officially a body of
nationwide scope, was dominated in the early years by New York interests. Id. at 18. The early
participants in the activities of the American Arbitration Association confirm the overwhelming
dominance of New York City in the Association's activities and management. The Association
appointed a board of industry leaders whose task was to promote arbitration across the country;
497 of the 520 members came from New York City itself, with several of the others from nearby
towns. See id. at 186-98.
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Now, in Alabama, Illinois, West Virginia, or California, do you want
to take a written contract in which there is a little clause sneaked in
the middle there that any disputes in this contract shall be submitted
to arbitration, and another little clause, "All arbitration shall take
place in New York and New Jersey?" [T]hat's what the85net result of
[other states' adopting the New York approach] will be.
The foregoing history shows that the campaign for modem
arbitration laws was heavily concentrated in New York City.86 The
New York Chamber of Commerce lobbied for reform in order both to
expand its status as the leading provider of general arbitration services
and also to respond to competitive threats from London and other
American states. Assisting or even leading this lobbying effort were
New York attorneys who perceived a potentially valuable source of
future business if arbitration agreements became enforceable in the
state. The New York arbitration law of 1920 served the purpose of
attracting arbitrations to New York (and avoiding losses of business to
competitor jurisdictions). The subsequent campaign to project the New
York statute to the federal government and other states, which was also
spearheaded by New York interests, also can be understood as part of a
These laws were needed to assure
competition for contracts.
contracting parties that their choice of a New York arbitral forum would
be respected even if a party wishing to avoid arbitration was able to
New York legal and
direct litigation into some other forum.
commercial interests worked together to maintain and enhance the
attractiveness of New York as a forum for arbitration chosen by parties
to commercial contracts.
B.

Assurance of Law and Forum

Further evidence that New York competes for commercial
contracts can be found in that state's treatment of contracts that select
New York law or a New York forum. As would be expected of a state
that competes for this business, New York is extraordinarily receptive to
enforcing contracts that select New York as the provider of law or
forum, even in cases where there are few or no other connections
between New York and the contract or the parties.
New York courts presume that the law selected by the parties will
85 HANDBOOK, supra note 81, at 77 (remarks of Mr. Miller).

86 See MACNEIL, supra note 35 (noting that the arbitration reform movement had its "first
flowering" in New York); see also HANDBOOK, supra note 81, at 63 (remarks of Mr. O'Connell)
(characterizing advocacy of irrevocable arbitration agreements as being characteristic of "the
school coming out of New York City"); id. at 75 (remarks of Mr. Miller) (discussing the "the new
cult down in New York").
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be applied. 87 If otherwise enforceable under contract law principles,
choice-of-law clauses will be respected unless they lack a reasonable
relationship to the state or violate a fundamental public policy. 88 These
exceptions are rarely (if ever) dispositive in New York commercial
litigation. The "reasonable relationship" standard is satisfied if there are
some contacts between the contract and the state, even if the contacts
with another jurisdiction are greater. 89 Indeed, the parties' decision to
select New York law in itself may constitute the requisite contact. 90
New York courts in commercial cases also strictly construe the
principle that the parties' choice of law may be ignored if it violates a
fundamental public policy. In applying this exception New York courts
appear to consider the public policy of New York only. 91 Thus
contracts selecting New York law appear to be immune from public
policy challenge in New York. As to contracts selecting another state's
laws, New York will refuse enforcement only when the chosen law
would infringe some "fundamental principle of justice. '92 It is difficult
to imagine that a New York court would often conclude that a decision
by sophisticated commercial parties to subject themselves to the law of
another state would fail this test. Indeed, because respecting the parties'
choice of law is itself a policy of New York, 93 it may be doubted that
94
such a choice would ever be considered against public policy.
Overall, therefore, it appears that choices of law in commercial cases
95
will receive nearly absolute respect in New York courts.
Most states follow New York in generally enforcing choice-of-law

87 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Orient Overseas Containers Lines, 230 F.3d 549, 556 (2d
Cir. 2000).
88 Finucane v. Interior Constr. Corp., 695 N.Y.S.2d 322, 324-25 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999);
Radioactive, J.V. v. Manson, 153 F. Supp. 2d 462, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
89 See Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, U.S., LLC v. Nackel, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4492
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Radioactive, 153 F. Supp.2d 462.
90 Cf. Mechanic v. Princeton Ski Shop, Inc., 1992 WL 397576, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting
that the parties' decision to select a particular law to govern their contract is given "heavy
weight" in determining the jurisdiction with the most significant contacts with a transaction).
91 Home Ins. Co. v. Appleton Papers, Inc., 2002 WL 22024 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Courts
applying New York conflicts of law rules are not completely in accord on this issue however.
See, e.g., DCMR v. Trident Precision Mfg., 317 F. Supp. 2d 220 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (fundamental
policy of a jurisdiction other than New York may provide a basis for New York courts refusing to
enforce a choice-of-law clause).
92 Cooney v. Osgood Mach. Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1993).
93 Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Control Components, 614 N.Y.S.2d 678, 681 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1993) ("public policy favors New York courts retaining lawsuits where New York is the
designated forum") (citation omitted).
94 The public policy limitation on enforceability of choice-of-law clauses appears to be
principally, if not exclusively, relevant to cases involving consumer contracts or other contexts
where the parties are deemed to possess significant inequality of bargaining power. See, e.g., Cap
Gemini Ernst & Young, U.S., L.L.C. v. Nackel, 346 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 2003) (employment
agreement).
95 See Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 95, 100 (N.Y. 1995).
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clauses. 96 Where differences exist, however, they tend to be in the
direction of giving less effect to these clauses. The public policy
exception to enforcement of choice-of-law clauses, for example, is
interpreted in many jurisdictions to include the fundamental policy of
states other than the forum. 97 This increases the likelihood that a court
will reject the parties' choice on public policy grounds. States other
than New York may also apply a more demanding concept of their own
public policy: Texas9" and California9 9 are examples. Some courts
interpret choice-of-law clauses more narrowly than other contract
terms,10 0 reject them for particular classes of contracts,10 1 disapprove
them as not reflecting the real intent of the parties, 102 or refuse to
recognize them if another state is found to have a materially greater
10 3
interest in the matter.
New York also favors party autonomy in forum selection.
Arbitration agreements are vigorously enforced in New York, even
05
when they foreclose class actions 104 or add nonstandard procedures.
New York is also receptive to judicial forum-selection clauses. New
10 6
York courts routinely enforce such clauses absent a "strong showing"'
that they result from fraud or overreaching, are unreasonable or unfair,
or contravene some strong public policy. 10 7
Such clauses are
96 See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1997, 46 AM. J.
CoMP. LAW 233, 273 (1998).
97 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).

98 See, e.g., Access Telecom v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 705-06 (5th Cir. 1999)
(refusing to enforce parties' choice of Mexican law on the ground of the "fundamental policy" of
Texas to "make valid export contracts in Texas for the sale of U.S. services").
99 See Govett Am. Endeavor Fund Ltd. v. Trueger, 112 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 1997)
(refusing to apply parties' choice of law to preclude enforcement of civil RICO statute); ABF
Capital Corp. v. Grove Properties Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (refusing to
respect New York choice of law on grounds it would violate fundamental state policy of requiring
reciprocal treatment of contracting parties with respect to attorneys fees).
100 See Thompson & Wallace of Memphis, Inc. v. Falconwood Corp., 100 F.3d 429 (5th Cir.
1996) (applying Texas law).
101 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 23:921(A)(2) (2009) (declaring choice-of-law clauses in certain
employment agreements unenforceable).
102 See, e.g., Fairfield Leasing Corp. v. Techni-Graphics, Inc., 607 A.2d 703 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1992) (refusing to accept an explicit and unambiguous choice-of-law provision in a
consumer contract on the ground that it did not reflect the "real intent" of the parties).
103 See Rosenmiller v. Bordes, 607 A.2d 465, 468 (Del. Ch. 1991).
104 See, e.g., Ranieri v. Bell AtI. Mobile, 759 N.Y.S.2d 448, 449 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
105 See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Revolving Door of Justice: Arbitration
Agreements that Expand CourtReview of an Award, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 861 (2004).
106 DiRuocco v. Flamingo Beach Hotel & Casino, Inc., 557 N.Y.S.2d 140 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990). A test of New York's commitment to enforcing forum selection clauses may be presented
in the controversy surrounding "portable" choice of forum clauses contained in various
agreements entered into by Norvergence Inc., a commercial leasing firm. See Sterling Nat'l Bank
v. Kings Manor Estates LLC, 2005 WL 2464167, at *7, n.7 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Oct. 6, 2005)
(collecting cases); IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Bros. Gen. Contractors, 2006 WL 230179 (7th Cir.
2006) (enforcing clause).
107 DiRuocco, 557 N.Y.S.2d 140.
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enforceable in New York even if they operate unilaterally to bind only
one of the parties. 0 8 They are defeated by claims of fraud in the
inducement only if the fraud alleged relates to the forum selection
clause itself rather than to the contract generally. 10 9 Conclusory
allegations of fraud or duress are insufficient; the complaining party
must allege facts setting forth a strong showing that the complaining
party was induced to agree to the forum-selection clause by fraud."I 0
Most other states enforce forum-selection clauses. But many do
not provide the same level of assurance to the parties. Some courts
retain jurisdiction over cases in which the parties have selected another
state's forum if they conclude that their own tribunals would be more
convenient."' Some are more willing to reject forum-selection clauses
112 are unreasonable," l3
on grounds that they contravene public policy,
fail to establish personal jurisdiction in the forum, 1 14 or fail to
accomplish "substantial justice.' 115 Some approve forum-selection
117
clauses only grudgingly, 116 reject them in particular types of cases,
exercise discretion over whether to enforce them, 1 8 or refuse to enforce
them at all. 119
108 See Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. N.Y. Convention Ctr. Dev. Corp., 838 F.2d 656, 660 (2d
Cir. 1988) (holding that a forum selection clause binding only one party is enforceable).
109 Stamm v. Barclays Bank of N.Y., 960 F. Supp. 724, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
110 Nat'l School Reporting Servs., Inc. v. Nat'l Schools of Cal., Ltd., 924 F. Supp. 21, 24
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). This is also the federal rule. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1,
12 (1972).
111 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.745(d)(3) (West 2009) (permitting Michigan courts to
retain jurisdiction, despite forum selection clause, if the state chosen by the parties would be a
"substantially less convenient place" for trial).
112 Compare Kubis & Perszyk Associates, Inc. v. Sun Microsystems Computer Corp., 680
A.2d 618 (N.J. 1996) (declaring forum selection clauses for agreements subject to the state's
franchise protection law to be "presumptively invalid"), with Hellex Car Rental Sys., Inc. v.
Dollar Sys., Inc., 2005 WL 3021963 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that New York franchise law does
not preclude forum-selection clause). California has been particularly active in rejecting forum
selection clauses on public policy grounds. See, e.g., Am. Online v. Superior Ct., 108 Cal. Rptr.
2d 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (enforcement of the contractual forum selection and choice-of-law
clauses in defendant's service agreements held to be unenforceable because they were the
functional equivalent of a contractual waiver of the consumer protections under the California
Legal Remedies Act); Hall v. Super. Ct., 197 Cal. Reptr. 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (California
Blue Sky law); GMAC Commer. Fin. LLC v. Super. Ct., 2003 WL 21398319 (2003) (California
Finance Lenders Law).
113 Churchill Corp. v. Third Century, Inc., 578 A.2d 532, 536 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
114 Johns v. Taramita, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1029 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Ex parte Kenco Signs &
Awning Div., Inc., 732 So. 2d 1019,1024 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
115 GMAC Commer. Fin., 2003 WL 21398319.
116 For example the Texas Supreme Court has upheld such a clause, but only by a 5-4 decision
that left considerable uncertainty as to the applicable law. See In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d
109 (Tex. 2004).
117 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 23:921(A)(2) (2009) (employment contracts).
118 See Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 551 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Cal. 1976) (forum
selection clauses may be given effect "in the court's discretion").
119 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 29-110 (2009); McCarty v. Herrick, 240 P. 192 (Idaho
1925); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (2009); State ex rel. Polaris Indus. v. Dist. Ct., 695 P.2d
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In the early 1980s the New York Bar Association became active in
attempting to provide even greater assurances that party choices of law
and forum will be respected in New York State. The committee
deliberations were explicitly tied to the self interest of the state. A
report of the Association's Committee on Foreign and Comparative
Law recognized several advantages that flowed from New York's
proven ability to attract contracts from other jurisdictions. Parties "not
otherwise having substantial connections with New York" may be
induced to conduct business in the state if they could be assured of a
New York forum and New York law. 120 New York's "legal and
business communities" would benefit "if significant agreements are
governed by New York law and if significant commercial litigation is
conducted in the state." 121 "New York's stature as a preeminent
financial and commercial center" would be "preserved and ultimately
22
enhanced."1
Also salient to the committee's deliberations was a concern that
New York's dominance in the market for contracts could be threatened
if the state failed to offer enhanced assurances that forum-selection and
choice-of-law clauses would be respected. The committee warned that
questions about the enforceability of New York choice-of-law and
forum-selection clauses could deter parties from selecting New York
law or forum. 123 The problem had become critical because "other
international business centers" had taken "affirmative measures to
attract foreign business by providing ready access to a competent forum
for dispute resolution."' 124 The committee recommended, therefore, that
"parties to significant commercial contracts should be encouraged to
submit to the jurisdiction of the New York courts and to choose New
125
York law as their governing law."'
The New
York
legislature
adopted
the
committee's
recommendations in 1984. Section 5-1401 of the General Obligations
Law, added in that year, provides that the parties to any contract for
more than two hundred fifty thousand dollars may "agree that the law of
[New York] shall govern their rights and duties in whole or in part,
whether or not such contract ...bears a reasonable relation to this
state." Section 5-1402 provides that any person may sue a foreign party

471 (Mont. 1985); Davenport Mach. & Foundry Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 314 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa
1982); Bartlett v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 46 Me. 500 (Me. 1859).
120 Committee on Foreign and Comparative Law, Proposal for Mandatory Enforcement of
Governing-Law Clauses and Related Clauses in Significant CommercialAgreements, 38 RECORD
OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 537, 537 (1983).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.at 538.
124 Id. at 548-49.

125 Id.at 549.
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in New York courts where the lawsuit relates to any contract for more
than a million dollars for which a choice of New York law has been
made under section 5-1401 and which contains a provision submitting
to New York jurisdiction. A provision of the Civil Practice Law and
Rules, also added in 1984, prohibits New York courts from dismissing
actions on forum non conveniens grounds where the action arises out of
a contract, agreement, or undertaking to which section 5-1402 applies
26
and the parties have selected New York law. 1
The upshot of these intertwining provisions is that parties to major
commercial contracts received a guarantee that New York courts will
respect clauses selecting New York as the law or forum, regardless of
whether they have any other connections with the state. New York's
innovation has been emulated by other states, including California
(1986),127 Florida (1989), 128 Delaware (1993),129 Ohio (1991), 130 and
13 1
Texas (1993).
C.

SuperiorAdjudicative Services

A prominent theory of Delaware's success in the market for
corporate charters is that the Delaware courts, and especially the
Delaware Chancery Court, offer expert, prompt, and reliable judicial
services for adjudicating corporate disputes. 32
Does a similar
phenomenon exist in the case of the market for contracts? This section
will illustrate how New York and other states compete for litigation
(and forum selection clauses) by offering upgraded judicial services to
major commercial parties.
Because of their location in the nation's most important
commercial city, state and federal courts in Manhattan enjoy a natural
advantage over other courts as preferred forums for the adjudication of
business disputes. Even so, New York has labored under certain
deficits as compared with Delaware in establishing its courts as national
leaders in its chosen fields. Delaware Chancery Court judges are
appointed for lengthy terms (twelve years) from a list submitted by a
judicial advisory council. 133 They tend to be persons with experience in
business law matters and good reputations among other lawyers and
126 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 327(b) (McKinney 2009).
127 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West 2009).
128 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 685.101 (West 2009).

129 DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 6, § 2708 (2000).
130 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.39 (West 2009).
131 TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51 (Vernon 2009).

132 See, e.g., ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 9, at 39-40; Kahan & Kamar, The Myth of State
Competition, supra note 2, at 708.
133 ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 9, at 40.
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 2092 2008-2009

20091

THE MARKET FOR CONTRACTS

2093

judges in the small world of the Delaware bar. New York trial court
judges, on the other hand, have been selected by politicians whose
interests are not necessarily consonant with identifying persons with
extensive business law experience or sensitivity to the needs of
international finance. 34 And while most New York state court judges
are public servants of sterling character and outstanding reputations, this
35
is not true for all.'
The problem faced by New York in supplying credible judicial
services to contracting parties was not limited to unpredictable judges.
Docketing practices employed in New York Supreme Court moved
matters from judge to judge as the case progressed. 36 Backlogs were
an issue. Businesses had to wait in line with all other civil litigants.
Moreover, unlike the Delaware Chancery Court, which operates without
a jury, an action for breach of contract for money damages would
ordinarily be tried to a jury in New York. 37 Commercial interests
frequently express dismay at the prospect of having their cases tried to a
jury, on the theory that people drawn at random from a jury pool are
unpredictable, unlikely to understand the complexities of a commercial
38
case, and prone to deciding cases on the basis of extraneous factors.
Other things equal, the prospect of submitting a case to a New York
jury might be considered a detriment to selecting New York as a forum.
These and other problems resulted in substantial dissatisfaction among
the business community with the judicial services provided in the New
York state court system. 39 Given a choice, business litigators were
likely to prefer to go to New York federal courts, 40 to the courts of
134 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REv. 431 (2004) (Brooklyn Democratic
Party leadership reportedly sold judgeships for $50,000, with the bribes being distributed up and
down the party food chain.).
135 See id. (describing alleged pattern of systematic criminality, favoritism and malfeasance in
the Brooklyn, New York court system).
136 See Tamara Loomis, High-Profile Case Casts Spotlight on Well-Regarded Court, N.Y.
L.J., June 20, 2002, at 5.
137 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of the U.S. v. State of N.Y., 550 N.E.2d 919, 922 (N.Y.
1990) (cause of action seeking money damages for breach of contract is quintessentially an action
at law).
138 See, e.g., John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers' and
Executives' Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 32-35, 51-52 (1998). Contracting parties in
New York can opt out of jury trials simply by including a well-drafted waiver in their
agreements. See Sherry Assoc. v. Sherry-Netherland, Inc., 708 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2000). Somewhat surprisingly, however, sophisticated parties frequently omit such clauses
from their agreements. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Do Juries Add Value?
Evidence From an Empirical Study ofJury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large CorporateContracts,4
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 539 (2007).
139 See Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History of the Creation and Jurisdiction of
Business Courts in the Last Decade, 60 BUS. LAw. 147, 152 (2004) (commercial courts created at
a "time of failing confidence in the state trial courts' ability to address business litigation").
140 See Bar Council Supports Commercial Divisions, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 20, 1995, at, 5 (A
committee of attorneys practicing in federal court predicted that the commercial divisions would
help end the state courts' status as the "less-favored forums for commercial and other complex
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another state such as Delaware, or to arbitration.1 4 1 The bad repute of
the New York state court system posed an obvious threat to New York's
142
ability to compete for contracts.
New York addressed these problems in the 1990s under the
leadership of Chief Judge Judith Kaye 43 and Robert L. Haig, a
prominent New York attorney. 44 In 1993 the state instituted a pilot
commercial court program in the New York County (Manhattan)
Supreme Court. 14 5 The program designated a single judge for
assignment to all aspects of a case, thus eliminating the revolving-door
approach to judicial assignments that had characterized the New York
system. Judging the experiment a success, the state established a
permanent Commercial Division of the Supreme Court in 1995.146 In
addition to continuing the policy of assigning one judge to a case, the
commercial division initiative enlisted judges and court personnel who
were experienced in business law, implemented new case management
techniques, and offered enhanced opportunities for court-annexed
alternative dispute resolution.1 47 The judges assigned to the commercial
division serve fourteen-year terms. They are selected by the Chief
Judge, and thus can be picked for their business law experience.1 48
They develop a reputation for expertise that enhances their stature and
also may improve their prospects for reelection. 49 Chief Judge Judith
Kaye explained that the purpose of the commercial division is to give
the New York business community a level of judicial service
"commensurate with its status as the world financial capital."' 50
The commercial division has been deemed a success, at least by its

litigation, resulting in the increasingly frequent resort by commercial litigators to federal courts
whenever a choice of forum is available.").
141 Bach & Applebaum, supra note 139, at 152 n. 12 (citing Legal Opinion Letter from Robert
L. Haig, Esq., to Washington Legal Foundation (Jan. 9, 1998)).
142 See Michael Bobelian, Rewriting the Rules: A Group ofJudges and Lawyers Seeks to Bring
More Consistency to Commercial Courts, N.Y. L.J., July 8, 2004, at 5 (describing fear of losing
litigation business).
143 Bach & Applebaum, supra note 139, at 153 n.20 (Robert L. Haig described "Chief Judge
Kaye as the only truly indispensable person in creating the Commercial Division.").
144 Id. at 153 n.20, 159 & n.73 (documenting Mr. Haig's role in promoting commercial courts
in New York and across the country).
145 Id. at 152.
146 See Daniel Wise, Supreme Court CommercialDivision Set Up: Crane, Rochester's Stander
Added to Handle Disputes, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 11, 1995, at 1. For a comprehensive account of the
creation of this and other business courts, see Bach & Applebaum, supra note 139.
147 See Bach & Applebaum, supra note 139, at 158-59.
148 Gary Craig, Three Vie For Two State JudicialSeats: Supreme CourtRace FeaturesRivals
With a Range of Experience, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Oct. 9, 2004, at 3B (citing the
"extensive tax and business law experience" of Commercial Division judge).
149 See Editorial, Our Recommendations, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Oct. 20, 2004,
at 8A (endorsing judge of the Commercial Division for reelection on the ground that the judge
had become an "expert jurist on contractual matters").
150 See Wise, supra note 146 (quotation omitted).
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promoters. The average time to resolve a contract action has reportedly
been reduced. 151 Jury pools are said to be improved as a result of more
intensive supervision by the commercial division judges. 152 Chief Judge
Kaye reported that judges of the commercial division are contributing to
a "growing body of commercial law once again being generated by the
New York State courts."'1 53 The court has "helped to stem the flight of
commercial litigants from New York's courts, and to maintain New
'154
York's status as the premier state for the conduct of business.
Other states have followed New York's lead in creating specialized
56
Massachusetts,157
business courts,155 including Pennsylvania,1
Maryland, 158 Colorado, 159 Florida, North Carolina, 160 Nevada, 161 and
Oklahoma. 162 An ad hoc committee of the American Bar Association
has also endorsed the idea. 163 Even staid Delaware has entered the
competition as a result of the expansion of Chancery Court jurisdiction
164
to include technology disputes.

151 NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL INSTITUTE, COMPREHENSIVE CIVIL JUSTICE PROGRAM 2005:
STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS
19 (2005), http://www.nycourts.gov/reports/civiljusticeprogram_2005.pdf.
152 Tommy Fernandez, Lawyers Mine Differences In Boroughs' Courtrooms; Jury Pools
Prove Anything But Equal; Official Attempts At Reform Fall Short, CRAIN'S NEW YORK
BUSINESS, Oct. 25, 2004, at 19; Interview, The Honorable E. Leo Milonas Urges Support Of
CourtReform, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Aug. 1999, at 50.
153 Judith S. Kaye, New York's Commercial Division Celebrates Four Years Of Solid
Progress, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Nov. 1999.

154 The Council on Judicial Administration, Report on the ChiefJudge's Court Restructuring
Plan, 52 THE REC. OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 929, 948 (1997).
155 See Kahan & Kamar, The Myth of State Competition, supra note 2, at 708-15 (contrasting
business courts with Delaware Chancery Court).
156 See Interview, Marc J. Sonnenfeld, PartneringWith Outside Counselfor a Philadelphia
Business Court, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Mar. 2000, at 1 (describing how
Philadelphia's business court initiative was explicitly modeled on the New York approach);
Melissa Nann Burke, Abramson Joining Commerce Court, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER Jan. 14,
2005, at I (commerce court judges must be "willing to work hard" and have "business sense");
Asher Hawkins, Bevilacqua Reflects On Time In Charge Of Phila. Bar Association, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 10, 2005, at 3 (commerce court now a permanent separate division).
157 See Bach & Applebaum, supra note 139, at 159.
158 MARYLAND

BUSINESS

AND

TECHNOLOGY

COURT,

MARYLAND

BUSINESS

AND

TECHNOLOGY COURT TASK FORCE REPORT app. B, at 24-25 (2000), http:// www.courts.state
.md.us/finalb&treport.pdf.
159 GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, COMMITTEE ON BUSINESS
COURTS, FINAL REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 14-15 (2000),
http://www.state.co.us/cjrtf/report/download/reportl.doc.
160 Carrie A. O'Brien, The North CarolinaBusiness Court: North Carolina'sSpecial Superior
Courtfor Complex Business Cases, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 367, 375 n.63 (2002); see also North
Carolina Business Court, http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net (last visited Feb. 7, 2008).
161 Bach & Applebaum, supra note 139, at 184.
162 Id.

163 A.B.A. Ad Hoc Committee on Business Courts, Business Courts: Towards A More
Efficient Judiciary,52 BUS. LAW. 947 (1997).
164 See Bach & Applebaum, supra note 139, at 151-52.
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Substantive Law

Delaware's success in the market for corporate charters is often
65
attributed to its responsiveness to the concerns of corporate managers.
Does a similar phenomenon occur in the case of commercial contracts?
A detailed analysis of substantive law is beyond the scope of this paper.
We can, however, examine several rules applicable to one industryfinance-which is a particularly prominent consumer of New York
choice-of-law and forum selection clauses.
New York courts and lawmakers do not disguise their concern to
serve the interests of global finance. 166 New York law has, in fact, been
accommodating to the interests of financial firmTS. 167 For example, New
York has an unusual procedure in its Civil Practice Law and Rules that
permits plaintiffs, in actions "based upon an instrument for the payment
of money only," to jump the litigation queue by filing a motion for
168
summary judgment against the defendant in lieu of complaint.
Although this statute has been used by a variety of plaintiffs, among its
principal beneficiaries are financial institutions seeking to enforce
defaulted loans.
Similarly, when the introduction of the Euro raised uncertainty
about the enforceability of contracts calling for settlement in outmoded
currencies, New York was in the vanguard of states acting to correct the
problem, enacting a statute in July 1997 declaring the Euro a
commercially reasonable substitute for the currency designated in the
69
contract. 1
New York has also been generous to financial institutions in the

165 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsideringthe Competition Over CorporateCharters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002); Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware CorporateLaw, 65
TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987) (Delaware likely to favor the interests of corporate managers over those
of the public on questions going to management entrenchment).
166 See Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 731 N.E.2d 581, 589 (N.Y. 2000)
(describing New York as the "financial capital of the world"); Credit Francais v. Sociedad
Financiera, 490 N.Y.S.2d 670, 676 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (New York law is to global commerce
what the dollar is to international finance: the internationally accepted legal standard.).
167 New York's receptive attitude towards commercial interests extends back at least to the
1920s.

See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND

IDEOLOGY INNEW YORK, 1920-1980, 80-92 (2001) (judges of the Court of Appeals-a majority
of them from the New York City area-crafted a set of rules tailored to suit the needs of
mercantile and commercial interests of New York City during the 1920s and 1930s).
168 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3213 (McKinney 2009).
169 N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-1603 (McKinney 2009). Illinois acted almost simultaneously
with New York, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 617 (West 2009), and several other states soon
followed suit. See James H. Fries, Jr., Continuity of Contracts After the Introduction of the Euro:
The United States Response to European Economic and Monetary Union, 53 BUS. LAW. 701
(1998).
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area of lender liability. Actual rather than constructive knowledge is the
standard in New York for proof of aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty. 170 Thus lenders will typically enjoy a defense against
claims by shareholders that they facilitated breaches of trust by
corporate managers. Similarly, New York law is unfriendly to the tort
of deepening insolvency, under which a lender can be held responsible
for actions that permit an insolvent firm to continue in operation while
losses mount.' 7' Under New York law, lenders can generally avoid
liability for extending credit to a firm in the zone of insolvency even if
72
the loans are ill-considered and contribute to creditor losses.1
The state's approach to traded financial contracts provides another
example of efforts to meet the needs of the finance industry. 7 3 New
York's Statute of Frauds had long required that certain widely used
financial contracts had to be signed by the party to be bound in order to
represent enforceable obligations.1 74 This presented a problem because
such contracts were typically made orally. Although commercial usage
was to treat them as legally binding at the time of the agreement, the
law technically allowed either party to avoid the transaction. Even
though it appears that social norms among traders prevented people
from relying on this avenue to escape their obligations, there was
always the possibility of breakdown in the event of market disruptions.
In response to this problem, New York revised its Statute of Frauds in
1994 to provide alternative means for establishing the enforceability of
agreements for the purchase and sale of currencies, commodities,
foreign exchange, deposits and options, indexes and similar
instruments. 75 The New York Legislature expanded the provision in
2002 to include institutional sales of commercial loans by means of
76
telephone or oral communications.

170 Lesavoy v. Lane, 304 F. Supp. 2d 520, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Thus even if a secured lender
knew of the fraud and received the proceeds of corporate looting in satisfaction of their claims,
this in itself is not sufficient to establish liability on an aiding and abetting theory. In re Sharp
International Corporation, 403 F.3d 43, 54 (2d Cir. 2005).
171See Paul Rubin, New Liability Under "Deepening Insolvency": The Search for Deep
Pockets, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 50 (2004); Jonathan M. Landers, Outside Counsel: Deepening
Insolvency Comes ofAge, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 5, 2006, at 4.
172 In re Global Service Group LLC, 316 B.R. 451 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
173 We thank Roberta Romano for bringing this to our attention.
174 See Denis M. Forster, Comment, Standard Swaps Agreements Don 't Insulate Users from
Risk, 159 AM. BANKER 20 (1994).
175 Codified as N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701 (McKinney 2009).
176 Codified as N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701(b)(1)(i) (McKinney 2009). See Letter from
Michael P. Smith, President, N.Y. Bankers Ass'n to The Hon. James M. McGuire, Counsel to the
Governor, July 3, 2002, N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2002 S.B. 5669, 225th Leg. Reg. Sess (2002).
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CONCLUSION

This paper documents the evidence of a market for contracting
with particular focus on the role of New York as the leading provider of
law and forum. New York law is the most frequently selected by
sophisticated parties to govern important agreements. Its courts, too,
are designated far more frequently than any other state's as forums for
resolving disputes.
The paper demonstrates that New York's
dominance is not accidental. For the better part of a hundred years the
state has engaged in affirmative and successful efforts to induce parties
to select New York as the provider of law and forum for large
commercial contracts.
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